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COMMENT
BEYOND CONVENTIONAL EDUCATION:
A DEFINITION OF EDUCATION UNDER





Since the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA)I was
passed in 1975, courts and commentators have attempted to apply its provi-
sions to a variety of children, all of them handicapped, each of them unique.
The results have often been dissatisfying to both parents and school systems,
due in large part to the definitional vagueness of the substantive provisions of
the Act. Although the EAHCA requires states to provide a free and appro-
priate education to all handicapped children, 2 Congress was less than clear in
defining that requirement.3 This ambiguity has led interested parties to
develop expectations and assumptions about what the state must provide to a
handicapped child by way of education. Subsequently, courts often have
rejected such beliefs as they attempt to interpret the intended meaning of
"appropriate education." 4
Both the judiciary and other observers have expressed opinions con-
cerning such issues as the classification of services as "related services," the
interpretation of the term "appropriate," and the categorization of the
Copyright © 1985 by Law and Contemporary Problems
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982).
2. In order to qualify for assistance, a state must have in effect "a policy that assures all handi-
capped children the right to a free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1982); see
also id. § 1400(c).
3. According to the EAHCA, free and appropriate public education is:
special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under
public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educa-
tional agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education
in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education pro-
gram required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1982).
4. Such lack of detail may have been necessary. Stated one court:
Recognizing the broad range of special needs presented by handicapped children, the lack of
agreement within the medical and educational professions on what constitutes an appropriate
education, and the tradition of state and local control over educational matters, Congress
refrained from mandating overly detailed programs.
Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 691 (3d Cir. 1981).
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reasons for residential placement as educational or other than educational. 5
Without a clear and uniform definition of education, however, any conclu-
sions on these and other such issues are incomplete and likely to be inconsis-
tent with each other and with legislative intent. For example, in order to
determine if education is appropriate, logically one must first determine what
education is. Likewise, if related services that enable a child to benefit from
special education are to be provided, an initial determination must be made
about what constitutes that education. Education is, after all, the noun to
which the modifiers "appropriate" and "special" attach.
A clear definition of education is also crucial in the development of the
handicapped child's individualized education program (IEP).6 Teachers and
parents must rely on their individual concepts of education when stating a
child's level of educational performance or developing a child's educational
goals. A widespread acceptance of a broad definition of education is evi-
denced by the fact that IEP's often include such activities as toilet training and
dressing oneself.
Additionally, in residential placement decisions, the classification of a
placement as educational or other than educational determines who will pay
for the residential part of that placement. 7 Furthermore, under the narrower
interpretations of education, some severely impaired children may be deemed
"ineducable." As the costs of residential placements for handicapped chil-
dren increase, so increases the significance of administrative and judicial dis-
tinctions among educational, psychological, custodial, and medical
placements.
5. See, e.g., Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458
U.S. 1121 (1982) (holding catheterization to be a related service); Tatro v. Texas, 481 F. Supp. 1224
(N.D. Tex. 1979) (holding catheterization was not a related service), vacated, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.
1980), on remand, 516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding catheterization to be a related service),
affd, 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Irving Indep. School Dist. v.
Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984); Rettig v. Kent City School Dist., 539 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ohio 1981)
(appropriate education), afd in part, vacated in part, 720 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 3581 (1984); Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. Va. 1981) (appropriate education);
Mooney & Aronson, Solomon Revisited: Separating Educational and Other than Educational Needs in Special
Education Residential Placements, 14 CONN. L. REV. 531 (1982); Stark, Tragic Choices in Special Education:
The Effect of Scarce Resources on the Implementation of Pub. L. No. 94-142, 14 CONN. L. REV. 477 (1982);
Stoppleworth, Criteria for Making the Decision: Placement in Residence for Educational or Other than Educa-
tional Reasons, 12 J.L. & EDuc. 77 (1983); Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103 (1979).
6. The EAHCA defines "individualized education program" as
a written statement for each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a representative of
the local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit who shall be qualified to. pro-
vide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of
handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or guardian of such child, and whenever appro-
priate, such child, which statement shall include (A) a statement of the present levels of educa-
tional performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term
instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to
such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educational
programs.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1982).
7. "If placement in a public or private residential program is necessary to provide special educa-
tion and related services to a handicapped child, the program, including non-medical care and room
and board, must be at no cost to the parents of the child." 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1984).
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This comment will offer the theory that education is a relative term. What
may be education for one child may not be for another., Such a theory finds
support in the legislative history of the EAHCA, in the relevant court deci-
sions, and in the conclusions of authors and educators in the field of special
education. The comment will present evidence to show that Congress relied
upon this broad concept of education when it enacted the EAHCA. Every
handicapped child, regardless of the nature or severity of the handicap, is
included within the Act's mandate. Education under the EAHCA must, there-
fore, include even such basic processes as the acquisition of life skills, no
matter how fundamental those skills may be.
In support of this theory, the educational setting and the legislative history
of the EAHCA will be discussed. This comment also will focus on administra-
tive and judicial standards developed for determining the educational require-
ments of the Act. Emphasis will be given to distinctions drawn by courts and
educational agencies in determining whether a given activity is education.
Such distinctions have been used to exclude from the Act's coverage some
emotionally disturbed children and some children considered to be inedu-
cable. Finally, the comment will recommend the acceptance of a uniform and
flexible definition of education consistent with the EAHCA, recent court deci-
sions, and traditional considerations.
II
BACKGROUND OF THE EAHCA
A. Recent Developments in Education
The objectives of education are many-faceted and certainly more far-
reaching than simple retention and usage of the "three R's." Social and
moral development, expression of self and creativity, acquisition of knowl-
edge, and attainment of skills and abilities needed in order to live in society
are all settled goals of education for all children.8
According to Black's Law Dictionary,
[Education] comprehends not merely the instruction received at school or college, but
the whole course of training[,] moral, religious, vocational, intellectual and physical.
Education may be particularly directed to either the mental, moral, or physical powers
and faculties, but in its broadest and best sense it relates to them all. [Education
includes the] [a]cquisition of all knowledge tending to train and develop the
individual. 9
Forty-nine states now require either attendance at a public school or a
state-approved private schooling experience. Such compulsory education is
evidence of a commitment to the further goals of socialization, increased pro-
ductivity, equal opportunity, and participation in democracy. I0 Paternalistic,
8. See M. FROSTIG, EDUCATION FOR DIGNITY (1976); S. SARASON &J. DoRIs, EDUCATIONAL HAND-
ICAP, PUBLIC POLICY, AND SOCIAL HISTORY (1979).
9. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 461 (5th ed. 1979).
10. See Sugarman & Kirp, Rethinking Collective Responsibility for Education, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1975, at 144.
Page 63: Spring 1985]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
economic, humanitarian, and protectionist attitudes also have been satisfied
by the imposition of compulsory education. Furthermore, as society has
grown more complex, formal agencies of government have supplanted fami-
lies in providing necessary training and education of children. Public schools,
initially established solely for the purpose of teaching academics, now include
in their curriculum such courses as sex education, vocational training, film-
making, driver training, and other nonacademic subjects.I In addition, public
schools receiving categorical aid under the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act are obligated to develop programs for educationally deprived chil-
dren 12 and for children whose native language is not English.' 3
The judiciary, like state and local legislatures, has recognized broader than
academic purposes for education. In its 1954 opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education, 14 the Supreme Court stated, "In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the oppor-
tunity of an education."1 5 Almost two decades later, the Court, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 16 recognized that education prepares individuals to be "self-reliant and
self-sufficient participants in society,"' 7 and assessed the value of that educa-
tion in terms of its capacity to prepare a child for life.
During this same period, the courts began responding to parents'
demands for meaningful specialized education for their handicapped chil-
dren. 18 In the early 1970's, district courts in Pennsylvania and in the District
of Columbia decided that their respective state or jurisdiction must provide
free public education appropriate to each handicapped child's capabilities,
regardless of the degree of impairment. In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Children v. Commonwealth19 (PARC) and Mills v. Board of Education, 20 the educa-
tional responsibility of the schools was defined to include instruction in the
most basic of life skills--eating, toileting, and self care. Additionally, as part
of a nationwide litigation campaign, lawsuits similar to these two landmark
cases were decided in almost thirty states, drawing much attention to the ineq-
11. Bateman, Prescriptive Teaching and Individualized Education Progranis, EDUCATING ALL HANDI-
CAPPED CHILDREN 39 (R. Heinrich ed. 1979).
12. 20 U.S.C. § 2733 (1982).
13. Id. § 3222. See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (school system's failure to provide
English language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry held a denial of a meaningful opportu-
nity to participate in public education programs and therefore a violation of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. Id. at 493.
16. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
17. Id. at 221.
18. Special education as it now exists is largely a product of the 1970's. Although special educa-
tion was advocated early in the 1900's and especially once compulsory education became the norm, it
was generally used as a means of excluding the severely impaired as ineducable and separating the
mildly handicapped and disruptive into special schools where they were taught basic academic sub-
jects, with appropriate adjustments, and such skills as sewing, weaving, basketry, and gymnastics. S.
SARASON &J. DORIS, supra note 8, at 275-79.
19. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (per curiam), 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972)(amending
consent agreement).
20. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
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uitable and unacceptable educational treatment of handicapped children, and
establishing their right to education.
The handicapped population was also fighting its battle against discrimina-
tion in institutions other than public schools. In response to demands for
equal opportunity in the workplace and in life generally, Congress in 1973
enacted the Rehabilitation Act, a general civil rights act for the handi-
capped. 2 1 Section 504 of the Act 22 prohibits discrimination in any federally
funded or assisted program or activity against an otherwise qualified handi-
capped person solely by reason of his or her handicap.
B. Legislative History
In the years preceding the enactment of the EAHCA, parents generally
were expecting more from public schools, handicapped persons were calling
for equality from all institutions, and parents of handicapped children were
demanding special education from the public schools. These three social
forces, the crunch of limited resources, and the Mills and PARC decisions con-
vinced Congress to take a more active role in the education of handicapped
children.
Congress initially added Title VI to the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act in 1966 to assist in the education of handicapped children. 23 In 1970
Congress repealed Title VI and created the Education of the Handicapped
Act, which authorized grants to the states for programs for the education of
handicapped children. 24 Although the Education Amendments of 197425
incorporated the major principles of the right to education cases into federal
law, limited resources continued to prevent implementation of many pro-
grams. The 94th Congress took its cue from the Mills and PARC decisions.
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare recognized this shortage
of resources when it reported that "[i]ncreased awareness of the educational
needs of handicapped children and landmark court decisions establishing the
right to education for handicapped children [point] to the necessity of an
expanded Federal fiscal role." 26
In 1975, to amend Title VI, to expand provisions enacted by the 93rd
Congress, and to maximize benefits to handicapped children and their fami-
lies, the 94th Congress enacted Public Law 94-142, the EAHCA. 27 The new
Act mandated that states make available to all handicapped children a free and
appropriate education consisting of special education 28 and related services 29
21. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 701-794 (1982)).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
23. Pub. L. No. 89-750, tit. VI, 80 Stat. 1191, 1204-10 (1966).
24. Pub. L. No. 91-230, tit. VI, 84 Stat. 121, 175-88 (1970).
25. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 489 (1974).
26. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1425, 1429.
27. 89 Stat. 773 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982)).
28. The Act defines "special education" as:
specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a
Page 63: Spring 1985]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
designed to meet their unique needs. Both the EAHCA itself and the imple-
menting regulations require that each state establish a goal of providing full
educational opportunity to all handicapped children.30 Congress, however,
failed to provide within the Act much guidance as to the specific activities
which would satisfy such a goal. The legislative history, on the other hand,
contains much evidence that Congress had in mind specific concepts of educa-
tion when it drafted and passed the EAHCA.
The Senate Committee and the legislative sponsors expressed their intent
that the Act enable each handicapped child to attain the self-sufficiency and
independence necessary for that child to share in and contribute to society
and, in many cases, to avoid institutionalization. The committee report
stated:
The long range implications of these statistics are that public agencies and taxpayers
will spend billions of dollars over the lifetimes of these individuals to maintain such
persons as dependents and in a minimally acceptable lifestyle. With proper education
services, many would be able to become productive citizens, contributing to society
instead of being forced to remain burdens. Others, through such services, would
increase their independence, thus reducing their dependence on society. 3'
Congress envisioned future savings of institutionalization costs for some
of these children who, through education, could eventually become self-suffi-
cient, contributing citizens instead of dependents of the state. Senator
Hathaway noted:
Though the cost of providing such opportunities is substantial, this cost must be
weighed against the cost to our society of people unable to utilize their talents fully, if
at all, and of course, the direct financial cost involved in unnecessary institutional care
which could be avoided if handicapped individuals were enabled to develop to their
full potential.3 2
handicapped child, including classroom instruction, instruction in physical education, home
instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1982).
29. "Related services" is defined under the Act as:
transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including
speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, rec-
reation, and medical and counseling services, except that such medical services shall be for diag-
nostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit
from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of handicapping
conditions in children.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982).
30. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(a) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(a) (1984).
31. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1425, 1433. See also H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1975).
Senator Williams expressed essentially the same concerns in floor debate when he said "pro-
viding appropriate educational services now means that many of these individuals will be able to
become a contributing part of our society, and they will not have to depend on subsistence payments
from public funds." 121 CONG. REc. 19,492 (1975). See also id. at 19,494 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
Congressman Brademas, cosponsor of the House bill and Chairman of the House Subcommittee
on Select Education, maintained the same position. According to the Congressman:
* * . [O]ver 50 percent of the handicapped children in this nation are being denied a funda-
mental educational opportunity which can help some of them become self-sufficient adults. ...
* * . This is a waste of one of our most valuable resources, our young people and the poten-
tial they possess to become contributing and self-sufficient members of this society.
Id. at 23,702-03.
32. 121 CONG. REC. 37,420 (1975). See also id. at 37,419 (remarks of Sen. Beall).
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Economic benefits to society from the contributions of these children were
quite evidently perceived by Congress as a justification for the Act. According
to one Senator:
[O]ur failure to stimulate his or her potential can only lead to despair and dependence
on the part of the handicapped individual, and this dependence will inevitably be
funded by the American public. More important than this cost, however, is the
resulting loss of the benefits that society might reap from the contributions these indi-
viduals could make.
33
Humanitarian concerns for the emotional health and well-being of handi-
capped children also apparently influenced the decision of Congress to enact
the EAHCA. Senator Williams, quoting first the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare, stated:
'I think we all understand that the handicapped are faced with extraordinary cir-
cumstances, and for that reason, need extraordinary responses and attention to deal
with their circumstances for the very reason you state-making them productive citi-
zens, capable of contributing, and even more, capable of self-respect and pride which
they so rightly deserve.'
It is this goal and purpose which S.6 addresses. This legislation was designed to
set forth a comprehensive program to meet the unmet needs of all handicapped
children.
3 4
Another compelling rationale expressed by supporters of the Act was
equality of educational opportunity. Senator Stafford commented, "We can
all agree that [the education of handicapped children] should be equivalent, at
least, to the one those children who are not handicapped receive."3 5 This
rationale was reiterated by Senator Williams, who said, "[T]his measure ful-
fills the promise of the Constitution that there shall be equality of education
for all people and that handicapped children no longer will be left out."3 6
In addition, some members of the House, including cosponsor Brademas,
implied in early discussions that the purpose of the Act should be to help each
handicapped child develop his or her maximum potential. "Individualized
plans are of great importance in the education of the handicapped child in
order to help them develop their full potential."3 7
For some or all of these purposes, the EAHCA was passed by a resounding
majority in both the House and the Senate. 38
It was the express intent of Congress that the goals of the Act be achieved
33. Id. at 19,505 (remarks of Sen. Beall); see also H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24
(1975).
34. 121 CONG. REC. 37,416 (1975); see also id. at 19,496 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
35. Id. at 19,483.
36. Id. at 37,413; see also id. at 37,410 (remarks of Sen. Randolph); id. at 37,411 (remarks of Sen.
Stafford).
37. Id. at 23,704; see also H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1975); 121 CONG. REC.
37,029 (remarks of Sen. Minish).
38. The House vote was 404-7; the Senate vote, 87-7. Most of the postconference debate
focused on disputes over the budget authorization. A number of congressmen opposed the authori-
zations section on the basis that it unfairly raised the hopes of the families of handicapped children,
since Congress would never actually appropriate that amount to the EAHCA programs. See generally
121 CONG. REC. 37,023-32 (1975) (House conference debate); id. at 37,409 (Senate conference
debate).
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through individualized education. 39 The requirement that special education
be designed for the unique needs of the child is emphasized within the Act,
especially in the provision which mandates the development of an IEP for
each handicapped child.40 An IEP is a written statement developed by a rep-
resentative of the local educational agency, the teacher, the parents, and the
child, which includes, inter alia, a statement of educational performance,
annual goals, and specific educational services to be provided. 4' In the defini-
tion of an IEP, as in other definitions in the Act, Congress provided no indica-
tion whether the teaching of life skills should be included in the handicapped
child's educational program.
Subsequently, however, courts and educational agencies have approved
educational programs which include such activities as toilet training, dressing
oneself, and feeding oneself.42 The inclusion of such activities is justified in
part by two express provisions of the EAHCA.
First are the priorities set forth in the Act for the provision of educational
services. Top priority is accorded to those handicapped children who are not
receiving any education; second priority is reserved for those who suffer from
the most severe handicaps within each disability and who are currently
receiving an inadequate education.43 Many of the children singled out for
priority treatment are those who have been excluded from public education
because they cannot walk or think like normal children, and who have handi-
caps which make learning to tie a shoe a monumental task. If such children
are to have first priority to EAHCA funds, then Congress must have intended
that the funds be used to provide useful life services. Instruction in subjects
which the child could never understand could not be considered "appropriate
education."
The second EAHCA provision relevant to this concern requires that fed-
eral funds be used to provide services over and above those any normal stu-
dent would receive. A handicapped child, according to the Senate Committee
report, has "a right to physical education services, health screening, transpor-
tation services and all other services which are provided to children within the
school system, and a right to as many options in curricula as are available to
all children." 44 Local education agencies must satisfy the state educational
agency that funds received under the EAHCA will be used for "excess
39. In H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975), the committee stated, "The committee
understands the importance of providing educational services to each handicapped child according
to his or her individual needs." See also 121 CONG. REC. 19,483-84, 37,410 (1975) (remarks of Sen.
Randolph); id at 19,504 (remarks of Sen. Mondale); H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, 19
(1975); 121 CONG. REC. 23,704 (remarks of Rep. Brademas); 121 CONG. REC. 37,026 (remarks of
Rep. Quie).
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (1982).
41. See supra note 6.
42. See infra section III B (discussion concerning the broad concept of education).
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320 (1984).
44. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1425, 1436.
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costs." 4 5 A public school has a commitment to spend the same amount of its
general funds on each child. If the school were only required under the
EAHCA to provide conventional education to handicapped children, it would
have few "excess costs." The Act contemplates that the education of a handi-
capped child will be more expensive than that of a nonhandicapped child.
Such "excess costs" would likely be the result of the provision of related serv-
ices or the development of a special educational program uniquely suited to
that child's needs and not available within the regular public school
curriculum.
III
STANDARDS AND A DEFINITION
A. Judicial and Administrative Standards
After the EAHCA was enacted, the different courts set about developing
various and often inconsistent standards to help them determine whether a
school system was providing an "appropriate education" under the Act.
Among the most popular of these standards were a self-sufficiency standard,46
an equality standard which required the provision of educational opportunity
commensurate with that given to nonhandicapped children, 47 a standard
which required the maximization of a child's potential,48 and a standard which
required eliminating the effects of the handicap. 49 A few courts tried more
unusual approaches, often borrowed from other areas of the law, including a
best interests of the child standard developed by a former family court judge50
45. "Excess costs" is defined by the Act as:
those costs which are in excess of the average annual per student expenditure in a local educa-
tional agency during the preceding school year for an elementary or secondary school student,
as may be appropriate, and which shall be computed after deducting (A) amounts received under
this subchapter or under title I [20 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.] or title VII [20 U.S.C. 3221 et seq.] of
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and (B) any State or local funds expended
for programs which would qualify for assistance under this subchapter or under such titles.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(20) (1982).
46. E.g., Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 603 (E.D. Pa. 1979), remanded, Battle v. Penn-
sylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981); Matthews v. Campbell, 1979-
80 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 551:264 (E.D. Va. 1979).
47. E.g., Springdale School Dist. v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300, 304 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S.
1118 (1982); Gladys J. v. Pearland Indep. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 1981);
Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y.), aftd, 632 F.2d 945 (1980), rev'd, 458 U.S. 176
(1982).
48. E.g., Rabinowitz v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 550 F. Supp. 481 (1982); Age v. Bullitt
County Pub. Schools, 1979-80 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 551:505 (W.D. Ky. 1980); cf. Bales
v. Clarke, 523 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. Va. 1981) (state is not required to provide a perfect education to
any child); Springdale School Dist. v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300 (8th Cir.), vacated, 458 U.S. 1118 (1981)
(state has no duty to provide the best education).
49. Harrell v. Wilson County Schools, 58 N.C. App. 260, 293 S.E.2d 687 (1982), appeal dismissed,
306 N.C. 740, 295 S.E.2d 759, cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983). In that case the court said:
We believe that our General Assembly "intended to eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least
to the extent that the child will be given an equal opportunity to learn, if that is reasonably
possible."
Id. at 264-65, 293 S.E.2d at 690 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 215 (1982) (White,
J., dissenting)).
50. Grkman v. Scanlon, 528 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
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and a standard which required the balancing of interests. 51
In 1982 the Supreme Court focused on the EAHCA for the first time in
Board of Education v. Rowley52 and either expressly or implicitly rejected all of
these prior standards. The standard to be used for determining appropriate
education, the Court held, was whether or not the child was receiving some
educational benefit. The rationale set forth was as follows:
Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a "free appropriate
public education" is the requirement that the education to which access is provided be
sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child. It would do
little good for Congress to spend millions of dollars in providing access to a public
education only to have the handicapped child receive no benefit from that education
... . We therefore conclude that the "basic floor of opportunity" provided by the
Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individ-
ually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.
5 3
Educational benefit in the case of Amy Rowley, a deaf child, meant she was
performing better than the average child and advancing easily from grade to
grade without the benefit of a sign language interpreter, although she under-
stood less than she would have if not handicapped. The Rowley court relied
considerably on the section of the EAHCA which requires the provision of
related services necessary to permit the child to benefit from his instruction.54
The Court rejected the idea that self-sufficiency could be a standard in
itself because it was at once an inadequate protection and an overly
demanding requirement. 55 According to the majority opinion, the references
in the legislative history to the attainment of self-sufficiency provided evi-
dence of a congressional intent that the services provided to handicapped
children be educationally beneficial, whatever the nature of their handicap.
Since maximization of a child's potential is not required of schools even in
reference to nonhandicapped children, the Court saw no reason to impose
such a standard in the case of handicapped children. The district court
opinion in Rowley acknowledged that even the best public schools lack the
resources to enable every child to achieve his full potential.56
Although the Rowley decision caused much consternation among commen-
tators and advocates of education for the handicapped, who believed the
Court was deviating from congressional intent, several factors reveal that it is,
in fact, a decision consistent with the sort of standard Congress desired. The
Court recognized that dramatic differences in ability exist from one handi-
capped child to the next and that one child may have little difficulty in an
academic setting while another child may encounter great difficulty in
51. Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107, 112-13 (W.D. Va. 1981).
52. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
53. Id. at 200-01.
54. Id.
55. This was so, according to the Court, because many mildly handicapped children will achieve
self-sufficiency without state assistance while personal independence for the severely retarded may
be an unrealistic goal. Id. at 201 n.23.
56. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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acquiring even the most basic of self-maintenance skills. 57 Therefore, the
Court confined its decision to cases in which a handicapped child is receiving
substantial specialized instruction and related services and who is performing
above average in the regular classrooms of a public school system. In doing
so, the Court gave credence to the notion that the teaching of life skills may
comprise education for some handicapped children who do not perform at
that level. Indeed, the tone of the opinion is clearly consistent with the legisla-
tive concern that all handicapped children be served regardless of handicap
and that priority be given to those not currently receiving an education. The
Court, according to its reading of the legislative history and in light of scarce
resources, considered children who were already receiving some benefits from
public school education to be low on the list of congressional priorities, if
covered at all, for they were receiving at least some education while others
were not.58
It is an unfortunate result of the Rowley decision that the most capable
handicapped children may bear the burdens of limited financial resources.
One commentator has concluded that
the expansive objectives of the Act are fundamentally at odds with the financial limita-
tions that American public schools encounter in the 1980's .... As a result, states
and localities are forced to make difficult triage decisions, sacrificing certain objectives
to accomplish others. These triage decisions often have a disparate impact on different
disability groups, pitting one group against another. 59
The Supreme Court in Rowley could not blindly enforce the EAHCA mandate
without regard for the realities of limited state educational resources. In
arriving upon its decision, the Court was enforcing what it saw as the most
explicit priorities of the Act, the education of the most severely handicapped
children, and sacrificing the least handicapped children to financial
limitations.
B. The Broad Concept of Education
It is necessary only to look at a sampling of EAHCA cases to discover that
many courts, regardless of the standard used, have taken for granted what the
Rowley court implied, the notion that a considerable range of activities and
skills training ought to be considered education for handicapped children.
Depending on the nature and severity of a child's handicap, a specific IEP
might include any of a laundry list of basic life skills, such as using a fork and
57. The Court also stated, "It is clear that the benefits obtainable by children at one end of the
spectrum will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at the other end. ... Rowley,
458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982).
58. The Court reached this conclusion in part because of the manner in which Congress
presented its statistics. Stated the Court:
By characterizing the 3.9 million handicapped children who were "served" as children who were
"receiving an appropriate education," the Senate and House Reports unmistakably disclose
Congress' perception of the type of education required by the Act: an "appropriate education"
is provided when personalized educational services are provided.
Id. at 196-97.
59. Stark, supra note 5, at 478-79.
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sorting tableware, brushing teeth, washing hands, putting on pants, being
mobile in the cafeteria line, walking independently from the bus, pouring
milk, using a handkerchief,60 developing communication skills (such as eye
contact, 61 use of written and oral language, and integration of language
skills62 ), bathing, cooking, cleaning, riding public transportation, learning
basic prevocational skills, 63 or any mix of cognitive, academic, prevocational,
and self-help skills. 64 One court has required the provision of a summer pro-
gram consisting of noninstructional enrichment activities such as camping,
field trips, swimming, other sports, playground and recreational activities,
gardening, and work skills training. 65 According to another court, an IEP
must focus on the acquisition of functional skills including daily living abili-
ties, vocational activities, recreational activities, social and community adjust-
ment, and the development of nonverbal communication skills.
66
Instead of focusing on specific skills, a number of other courts have simply
held that the concept of educatiop is necessarily broad with respect to many
profoundly and severely impaired children 67 and "embodies both academic
instruction and a broad range of associated services traditionally grouped
under the general rubric of 'treatment.' "68 In Kruelle v. New Castle County
School District, 69 for example, the Third Circuit used a broad concept of educa-
tion to include within the EAHCA mandate the needs of 13-year-old Paul
Kruelle, a profoundly retarded child suffering also from cerebral palsy. Paul
had the social skills of a 6-month-old child and an IQwell below 30. He could
not walk, dress himself, speak, or eat unaided, was not toilet trained, and had
a low receptive communication level. Paul also had emotional problems
which caused him to choke and induce vomiting when he was under stress. 70
Nevertheless, the court held that Paul was entitled to education under the
EAHCA.
60. Matthews v. Campbell, 1979-80 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 551:264, :265 (E.D. Va.
1979).
61. Stacey G. v. Pasadena Indep. School Dist., 547 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
62. Matthews v. Ambach, 552 F. Supp. 1273 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
63. In re Alison I., 1979-80 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 501:257, :258 (Conn. SEA 1979).
64. Adams Cent. School Dist. v. Deist, 214 Neb. 307, 334 N.W.2d 775 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 239 (1984).
65. Birmingham School Dist. v. Superintendent of Pub. Instr., 120 Mich. App. 465, 328 N.W.2d
59 (1982).
66. Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 55 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
67. See definition of "profoundly retarded" and "severely retarded," infra text accompanying
note 120.
68. Tilton v.Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 705 F.2d 800, 803 (6th Cir. 1983); see Abrahamson
v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983); Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687
(3d Cir. 1981).
In a case brought under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act against a
state school, the Supreme Court recognized that "[t]here is a technical difference between treatment
which applies to curable mental illness, and habilitation, which consists of education and training for
those, such as the mentally retarded, who are not ill." Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 7 n.2 (1981). While the Court recognized this technical difference, it declined to make that
distinction for the purposes of the case.
69. 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981).
70. Id. at 688-89.
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In such situations courts and educators may even conclude that academic
achievement should be secondary to the acquisition of basic life skills if the
EAHCA is to achieve its goals of self-sufficiency and educational benefit. 7'
Courts often have based such decisions, at least in part, on the legislative
emphasis on individualization. 72
Other courts have noted that the establishment of a priority for the most
severely handicapped children revealed congressional awareness of severely
and profoundly impaired children and of the foundational nature of their edu-
cation. 73 As one court observed, "It is not unusual for the [severely or pro-
foundly retarded] child to enter the school system without such basic skills as
toilet training, self-dressing and self-feeding. If this is the case, that is where
the educator begins; the educational program will be designed to teach these
skills." 74
The idea that the education must fit the child was expressed by another
court in the following manner:
Placement of children with the intelligence of 2-year-olds in a program which empha-
sizes skills such as reading and writing would seem inadequate for their needs. The
harmful consequences of denying plaintiffs an adequate education is underscored by
the fact that mentally retarded children have greater need for formal education since
they are less likely than ordinary children to learn and develop informally. 75
The judicial acceptance of such theories becomes evident in cases where
the courts have not even attempted to identify a concept of education but,
nevertheless, have required the provision of special education services and
residential placements to children who are absolutely incapable of benefitting
from traditional public school training. In Gladys J v. Pearland Independent
Schools, 76 for example, a Texas district court, without attempting to define
education, ordered residential placement for a 15-year-old schizophrenic and
brain-damaged girl who was functioning at a prekindergarten level, was inca-
pable of washing or dressing herself unaided, and could not maintain consis-
tent toileting and eating skills. Similarily, the court in Rabinowitz v. New Jersey
Board of Education77 mandated educational services for an l i-year-old severely
retarded child suffering from Down's Syndrome. Before entering school,
Abby Rabinowitz had no speech, extremely limited fine and gross motor activ-
ities, and an IQ of 20. Her subsequent educational progress consisted of
learning to feed and dress herself.
The provision of educational services in such cases is the result of the
deciding courts' broad concept of education. If these courts did not believe
71. Rettig v. Kent City School Dist., 539 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ohio 1981), afd in part and vacated
in part, 720 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2379 (1984).
72. Crawford v. Pittman, 708 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1983).
73. E.g., Kruelle, 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981); Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir.
1983).
74. Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 591 (E.D. Pa. 1979), remanded sub nom. Battle v. Penn-
sylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981).
75. Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 959 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
76. 520 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
77. 550 F. Supp. 481 (D.N.J. 1982).
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that life skills were a part of education, they would not prescribe educational
services for children who were capable of learning little else.
IV
CONCEPTS IN CONTROVERSY
Not all courts have adopted such a broad concept of education for the
purposes of the EAHCA, especially when the end result is residential place-
ment. A great deal of the debate centers around the creation of a distinction
between placements for educational purposes and placements for noneduca-
tional purposes. 78 This issue is divisible into two separate issues, both of
which are significant in developing a practicable definition of education. First,
a number of courts have purported to draw a line between psychological
placements and educational placements. Second, some courts have decided
that children with exceptionally severe handicaps are ineducable and there-
fore not included in the group to be served by the EAHCA.
A. The Psychological/Educational Distinction
Placements for medical reasons are not considered educational placements
under the EAHCA, and in such situtations, the school system is responsible
only for the educational services rendered during the length of a child's hospi-
talization. 79 Some courts, and more educational agencies, have compared sit-
uations where a child is emotionally impaired with those where placement is
necessary for medical reasons, and have reached similar results.8 0
In McKenzie v. Jefferson, 81 11-year-old Alexandra McKenzie was determined
by a hearing officer to be a seriously emotionally disturbed child. She had
suddenly begun to experience feelings of grandiosity, depersonalization, and
hallucinations of being Jesus. Later she started experiencing severe night-
mares and depression, suffering severe pain with no organic basis, and exhib-
iting psychotic behavior. Nevertheless, the hearing officer refused to order
the school district to pay for Alexandra's residential placement at a school for
the learning disabled and emotionally disturbed. Instead he tried to place her
at St. Elizabeth's Hospital which had no suitable program. The District of
78. The regulations read in part:
If placement in a public or private residential program is necessary to provide special education
and related services to a handicapped child, the program, including non-medical care and room
and board, must be at no cost to the parents of the child.
Comment. This requirement applies to placements which are made by public agencies for
educational purposes, and includes placements in State-operated schools for the handicapped,
such as a State school for the deaf or blind.
34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1984).
79. See supra note 28 (definition of "special education" under the Act).
80. E.g., In re Bill D., 1980-81 Enuc. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 502:259 (Conn. SEA 1981)
(child with schizotypal personality disorder was denied residential placement because the curriculum
of the residential school was the same as that of a normal high school with the addition of therapy); In
re Edward K., 1979-80 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 501:315 (Conn. SEA 1979) (child's
behavior and psychiatric problems influence and override educational needs).
81. 566 F. Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1983).
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Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) eventually placed her at a day school on the
grounds of her residential school. The district court concurred with the argu-
ment of the DCPS that Alexandra was a very sick child whose illness directly
caused her hospitalization for treatment and whose placement was therefore
medically founded. 82 The court analogized her situation to that of a child
who must be hospitalized for physical injury after an accident, and before
receiving special education. Special education, concluded the court, referred
to education as that term is commonly understood. It is " 'specially designed
instruction.' . ..[T]he key word is instruction as it relates to education." 83
Other courts have declined so to dichotomize educational and psycholog-
ical needs. These courts may be separated roughly into two further catego-
ries: those who refuse to separate needs which are "intertwined," and those
who perceive some differences between psychological and educational needs
but consider psychological treatment obligatory on a related services basis.
The court in North v. District of Columbia Board of Education 84 was of the
former persuasion. Ty North, a 16-year-old boy, was epileptic, emotionally
disturbed, and learning disabled. When Ty was discharged from his original
institutional placement, his parents refused to accept him and he was placed
in a psychiatric treatment center. The Board of Education contended that
Ty's educational needs could be met by a special education day program while
his emotional difficulties admittedly required residential treatment. There-
fore, the Board argued that the cost of residential placement should not be
the responsibility of the public schools. The court disagreed and ordered the
Board to provide an appropriate residential academic program with necessary
psychiatric, psychological, and medical support and supervision.85 All of Ty's
needs were so intimately intertwined that it was not feasible to separate
them.86
Since the North decision, other courts have seized this rationale to justify
requiring state educational agencies to provide residential placement for
schizophrenic and other emotionally and behaviorally disturbed children.87
In Kruelle v. New Castle County School District, 8 8 the court combined a broad con-
cept of education with this alleged inextricability of medical and educational
needs and ordered residential placement as a necessary ingredient of Paul
82. Id. at 412.
83. Id. at 411.
84. 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979).
85. Id. at 141-42.
86. Courts have often declined to decide matters of educational policy on the theory that courts
lack sufficient expertise in such matters and educational policy decisions have traditionally been the
responsibility of the state educational agencies. The North court added an interesting twist to that
philosophy. While the court asserted its own inability to distinguish educational from other needs, it
contemporaneously refused to allow state agencies to do the same. By so deciding, the court implied
that matters concerning the scope of the EAHCA will not be decided by the individual state educa-
tional agencies but are the responsibility of the court.
87. E.g., GladysJ. v. Pearland Indep. Schools, 520 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Erdman v.
State, 1980-81 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 552:218 (D. Conn. 1980); Christopher T. v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 553 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
88. 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981); see also supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
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Kruelle's learning. That court denied that its decision signaled an abdication
of difficult decision making and claimed that the inseverability of such needs is
the very basis for holding that the services are an essential prerequisite for
learning.89
The Kruelle court also touched on a second theory used by courts unwilling
to bifurcate psychological and educational needs completely, the classification
of psychological treatment as related services. That theory states that even
though psychotherapy and other psychiatric services might be related to
mental health, such counseling also may be required before a child can benefit
from an education. Psychological treatment, therefore, should be considered
a related service in the same way that tutoring in sign language has been
required as a related service, because it is necessary before a particular child
can benefit from education.90 Such a theory is supported further by the defi-
nition of related services in the EAHCA, which includes psychological
services.91
In In re "A "Family, 92 the Montana Supreme Court ordered a school system
to provide a residential placement, including an intensive psychotherapy pro-
gram, to a mildly mentally retarded and schizophrenic child on the grounds
that psychotherapy is not a medical service but a psychological service which
is part of related services. Likewise, in Papacoda v. Connecticut, 93 all of the par-
ties agreed that Cherie P., an 18-year-old seriously emotionally disturbed
child, could not be educated without a residential placement which coordi-
nated a therapy program with the teaching program. The court distinguished
this type of placement from one solely for reasons of health, and ordered the
school system to place Cherie in a proper facility which, in the court's opinion,
was necessary in order to render her educable. 94 "The purpose of the Act is
to provide education for handicapped children, no matter what the source or
severity of their problems. . . . Placement in an educational institution
designed to educate students with a particular handicap must be recognized
as having an educational purpose." 95
Even in situations similar to those in Papacoda and North, the courts refrain
from holding that a residential placement will be considered to be for educa-
tional purposes in all situations where medical or emotional needs affect edu-
cational needs. For example, the North court noted that in some situations it
may be possible "to ascertain and determine whether the social, emotional,
medical, or educational problems are dominant and to assign responsibility
89. 642 F.2d at 693-95.
90. E.g., Parks v. Pavkovic, 557 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Gary B. v. Cronin, 542 F. Supp.
102 (N.D. Ill. 1980). For good examples of related services cases, see Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823
(5th Cir. 1983), afd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371
(1984), and Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1121 (1982).
91. See supra note 29 (definition of "related services" under the Act).
92. 184 Mont. 145, 602 P.2d 157 (1979).
93. 528 F. Supp. 68 (D. Conn. 1981).
94. Id. at 71.
95. Id. at 72.
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for placement and treatment to the agency operating in the area of that
problem." 96 This concept has subsequently been reiterated, by the courts in
Kruelle and Gladys . v. Pearland Independent Schools, 97 for example. Similarly,
the court in Papacoda implied that a distinction existed between the placement
of Cherie P. and a placement in which the need for education in an institution
arises merely because the plaintiff must be institutionalized for psychiatric
reasons, thus requiring educators to come to the hospital in order to reach the
student.
The same distinction was drawn by the Pennsylvania state educational
agency in In re Carlisle Area School District 9 8 when it considered the special edu-
cation needs of Timothy L., a socially and emotionally disturbed child with a
learning disability. The agency ordered a placement for Timothy which pro-
vided a more highly controlled and ordered educational program than any-
thing available in the public schools. 99 According to the agency, a program is
special education as long as it is designed to have an immediate and measur-
able impact on poor classroom performance which is the product of a stu-
dent's handicap.100 In any event, the agency continued, no substantial
evidence appeared on the record to show that Timothy suffered from halluci-
natory psychosis, autism, or any other extreme mental disorder. Such disor-
ders would necessitate a child's placement in a psychological or health care
institution for basic custodial or health needs rather than for the receipt of
special education.10' Judicial and agency statements like the preceding seem
to reveal the belief that, in some subsequent case, the deciding court or
agency would have the authority, if not the duty, to consider the placement of
a seriously emotionally disturbed child a placement for other than educational
purposes.
Certainly the EAHCA and its regulations do not mandate such results.
The stated purpose of the Act is to assure that all handicapped children have
available to them a free and appropriate public education, which emphasizes
special education and related services designed to meet their particular
needs. 10 2 The EAHCA expressly includes seriously emotionally disturbed
children within its definition of handicapped children.10 3 "Seriously emotion-
ally disturbed" is defined in the EAHCA regulations as
a condition exhibiting one or more of the following characteristics over a long period
of time and to a marked degree, which adversely affects educational performance:
96. 471 F. Supp. at 141.
97. 520 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Tex. 1981); see supra text accompanying note 76.
98. 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:194 (Pa. SEA 1982).
99. Id. at 504:198-99.
100. Id. at 504:196.
101. Id. at 504:197.
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1982).
103. The EAHCA definition of handicapped children reads as follows:
The term "handicapped children" means mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech
impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or
other health impaired children with specific learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require
special education and related services.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1982).
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(A) An inability to learn which cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory, or
health factors;
(B) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with
peers and teachers;
(C) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances;
(D) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression; or
(E) A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or
school problems.
(ii) The term includes children who are schizophrenic. The term does not
include children who are socially maladjusted, unless it is determined that they are
seriously emotionally disturbed.
10 4
Residential programs, including nonmedical care and room and board,
must be provided at no cost to the parents of the child if a placement is neces-
sary to provide special education and related services to a handicapped
child. 10 5 The comment to the EAHCA regulations applies the foregoing
requirement to "placements which are made by public agencies for educa-
tional purposes."' 0 6 It remains possible that some courts may have viewed
this comment as a limitation on the rights of handicapped children by inter-
preting educational purposes to mean only conventional education. To an
emotionally disturbed child, however, the educational environment is a partic-
ularly important educational service. It is not uncommon for a seriously emo-
tionally disturbed child's educational program to include psychotherapy or
other programs designed to develop relationships with others, decrease inap-
propriate behavior, and increase appropriate behavior. 10 7 Such services are
no less important to the education of a seriously emotionally disturbed child
than clean intermittent catheterization is to the education of a spina bifida
child, or learning to add before learning to multiply is to the education of a
nonhandicapped child. Reading the comment to the regulations to impose
narrow limitations on the meaning of education would prevent many seriously
emotionally disturbed children from receiving the services necessary to their
learning. Such an exclusion would be inconsistent with the federal mandate
of providing education to all handicapped children, including the emotionally
disturbed, regardless of the degree of handicap.
In addition, some courts may wrongly rely on the definition of "specific
learning disability" in the regulations to exclude seriously emotionally dis-
turbed children from the scope of the Act. That definition excludes from spe-
cific learning disabilities those learning problems which are primarily the
result of visual, hearing, or motor handicaps, of mental retardation, of emo-
tional disturbance, or of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvan-
tage. 10 That phrase must be considered in context, however, by
remembering that almost all of the handicaps listed, including emotional dis-
turbance, are mentioned specifically in other provisions of the EAHCA. In
104. 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b)(8)(ii) (1984).
105. Id. § 300.302.
106. Id.
107. Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 591 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
108. 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b)(9) (1984).
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the learning disabilities section, Congress separated seriously emotionally dis-
turbed children from those with learning problems resulting from environ-
mental, cultural, or economic disadvantage. Clearly, the children excluded
are not the emotionally disturbed children defined earlier in the Act, but are
those children who have difficulty learning because of their home situations,
cultural differences, or economic disadvantages. This section, according to
the legislative history, is intended to exclude "slow learners."' 0 9
Courts have appeared more willing to impose the responsibility for resi-
dential programs on school systems when the emotionally disturbed children
suffer from other physical or mental handicaps, when their emotional distur-
bance is congenital or organic, or when the child is adopted. 110 Such distinc-
tions are probably the result of a widespread notion that emotional handicaps
can be attributed to parental influences and a judicial view that courts should
not force educational systems to pay for handicaps caused by poor
parenting."' The idea that a serious emotional illness, such as that of Alex-
andra McKenzie," 12 is caused by a child's parents is speculative at best, espe-
cially in light of the inherent difficulty of tracing any emotional problems to
their origins, and the lack of any detailed psychological knowledge or
background.
Moreover, even if one could prove that the handicap was caused by a
child's parents, the EAHCA does not allocate education based upon the origin
of any child's handicap, but covers all children suffering from one or more of
the handicapping conditions mentioned in the Act's virtually all-inclusive
list." 13 The extreme result of such allocation could be the exclusion of broad
categories of children whose handicaps were in some manner caused by their
parents. For instance, a child with permanent physical injuries resulting from
an accident caused by his father or a baby born with defects as a result of its
mother's negligence during pregnancy might be excluded from special educa-
tion programs because its parent caused its defect. No reasonable educational
agency would consider making such exclusions. To differentiate among hand-
icapped children would not only violate the equal education standards specifi-
cally endorsed by Congress in the legislative history of EAHCA, but it also
would conflict with the pervading underlying philosophy of the Act. The
EAHCA is a child-based statute, enacted to assist all handicapped children
based on their own varied and individual special education needs. Neverthe-
less, many courts and educational agencies hold fast to their perception that
residential placements for some seriously emotionally disturbed children are
109. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1425, 1434.
110. For instance, the handicapped child in Gladys]. suffered from organic brain damage, the
Kruelle and North children were both multiply handicapped, and the handicapped child in In re "A "
Family had been adopted by the "A" family. Christopher T. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,
553 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D. Cal. 1982), involved one child who was both schizophrenic and mentally
retarded and another child who had been rejected by his family.
111. See Stark, supra note 5, at 521-23.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
113. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1982); see supra note 103.
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not the responsibility of the school system because their parents somehow
caused their handicaps.
Some states have enacted statutes which separate medical, psychological,
and institutional care or services from educational services." 4 In four of
these states litigation infrequently arises over responsibility for residential
placement costs because statutes mandate interagency cooperation in the
delivery of special education services. 1 5 For use in one of these states, an
observer has suggested the consideration of a modified "but for" test, which
asks whether an educational program appropriate to meet the unique needs of
the particular student is available and could be implemented but for the need
for other than educational services, such as medical care or residential care
outside of the home." l 6 Noneducational placements might include place-
ments made because of abusive or neglectful home conditions affecting the
safety and health of the child. This practice of interagency cooperation is
expressly permitted under the EAHCA. l" 7
In states without such interagency cooperation statutes, another provision
of the EAHCA, making the state educational agency responsible for assuring
that all educational programs, including those administered by other agen-
cies, are carried out according to state educational standards," 18 becomes rel-
evant. In other words, the educational agency may divide costs with other
agencies according to state definitions of educational and other than educa-
tional purposes. The educational agency, however, is responsible for assuring
that all educational programs for all handicapped children within the EAHCA
definition, including programs for the seriously emotionally disturbed, are
provided without cost to the child's parents. Under the theory of education
proposed in this discussion, education for seriously emotionally disturbed
children includes instruction in whatever they are capable of learning, starting
with fundamental skills, along with the related services they need in order to
benefit from that education. It is presumed that residential care which pro-
vides the necessary environment for a child's education would be included. If
a child can only learn in a residential placement, then that placement is for
educational purposes and should be financed by the state.
114. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1015G (1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76d(d) (West 1981 &
Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
71B, § 10 (West 1978 & Supp. 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 395.050 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-33-90
(Law. Co-op Supp. 1983).
115. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1015G (1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76g (West 1981 & Supp.
1983); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 71B, § 10 (West 1978 & Supp. 1983).
116. See Mooney & Aronson, supra note 5, at 553.
117. According to 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(a) (1984):
Each State may use whatever State, local, Federal, and private sources of support are available in
the State to meet the requirements of this part. For example, when it is necessary to place a
handicapped child in a residential facility, a State could use joint agreements between the agen-
cies involved for sharing the cost of that placement.
118. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6) (1982).
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B. The Educable/Ineducable Distinction
The educability of severely handicapped children is an even more hotly
contested issue, largely because of the disproportionate cost-benefit ratio
associated with educating the severely handicapped. 11 9 Since such decisions
usually deal with the severely or profoundly retarded child, it may be helpful
to define briefly the different classifications of mentally retarded children as
outlined by the court in Armstrong v. Kline. 120
A "mildly retarded" child has an IQbetween 50 and 75. He or she may be
able to read at a second or third grade level, do simple math, and function in
society. Such children are often unidentifiable and can perform skilled and
semiskilled work. The "moderately retarded" child has an IQbetween 30 and
50 and frequently has physical impairments. He or she can learn simple arith-
metic, basic vocabulary, and fundamental reading skills. Children with IQ's
below 30 are considered "severely or profoundly impaired" (SPI). A
"severely retarded" child usually will have a physical handicap, some difficulty
in moving, and may lack many basic self-help and language skills. Though
academically limited, a severely retarded child may learn to count, tell time,
and identify a few words. "Profoundly retarded" children are likely to be
nonambulatory, have no vocabulary, and possess minimal means of communi-
cation. They are much slower learners, forget those things learned more
quickly than nonhandicapped children, and have great difficulty generalizing
and transferring skills learned in one environment to another environment.
These SPI children pose perhaps the greatest problems for interpreters of the
EAHCA.
Of the five children involved in Armstrong two were SPI children. The
other three children were seriously emotionally disturbed. One of the SPI
children was Gary Armstrong, who was also hyperactive, partially deaf, and
suffered from San Fillipo Syndrome, a fatal disease which caused him to have
joint contractures and psychomotor seizures. The other was 17-year-old Nat-
alie Bernard, who was also orthopedically impaired. She had acquired some
reading and music skills, but few intellectual or social skills. Educators of the
five children articulated their goals for four of the children as the attainment
of each child's highest potential in terms of the highest degree of self-suffi-
ciency. In Gary Armstrong's situation, the educational goal was to keep him
mobile and at home as long as possible in order to increase his life expec-
tancy. His program consisted of instruction in the following: sitting down
119. Note that one author stated:
When funds are expended to provide an appropriate education for handicapped children,
thereby rendering them capable of becoming productive members of society, few observers
would object that the money is being wasted. When funds are diverted from the already scant
resources allocated for the education of non-handicapped students in an attempt to educate
children whom experts believe are incapable of ever functioning in society, however, the benefits
may be outweighed by the costs.
Comment, A Modern Wilderness-The Law of Education for the Handicapped, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1045,
1064 (1983).
120. 476 F. Supp. 583, 588 (E.D. Pa. 1979), remanded sub nom. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d
269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981).
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when asked, keeping his hands down, dressing, coming when called, feeding
himself, toilet training, and sign language. All of this instruction was for the
purpose of allowing him to be controlled at home. Natalie's program con-
sisted of basic language, arithmetic, and living skills for the purpose of
enabling her to live and work outside an institutional setting.
In striking down the school system's rigid policy of limiting instruction for
all children to 180 days per year, the court considered the meaning of educa-
tion for SPI children, many of whom enter the school system without basic life
skills. The court stated that in such circumstances, the child's education
begins with the teaching of those skills.' 2 ' The court went on to express its
conviction that Congress' intent in enacting the EAHCA was to provide for
that education which would leave these children as self-sufficient as possible
within the limits of their respective handicaps. 22 On appeal, the Third Cir-
cuit also struck down the rigid 180-day policy but it remanded the case for
modification of the district court's orders.' 23 According to the circuit court,
the district court had acted improperly in focusing on the Act's provision of
the particular educational goal of self-sufficiency, when such educational
policy decisions should be left to the states. 124 The court of appeals disputed
neither the facts nor the district court's determination that these children
should be provided education. Rather, it repeated the lower court's percep-
tion that the point where formal education begins is where a handicapped
child is lacking self-help and social skills.
This perception is not a new one. As long ago as 1908, advocates
espoused special education as natural development, according to a general
principle of special education commanding that education begin where the
defect impeded the normal development of the child.' 25 In 1979, Sally
Smith 126 restated the same principle. In her book, Smith stated that no
matter how difficult it may be to find an activity that a child can do indepen-
dently, one must be found in order to offer him an opportunity for success. A
child may need to be taught a whole spectrum of readiness skills before any
attempt can be made to achieve his ultimate goals, because he may not have
the foundations on which to begin.' 27
Such principles are premised on a belief that every child can learn or, con-
versely, that no child is ineducable. Not all courts and educational agencies,
121. See supra text accompanying note 73. For examples of other cases concerning the validity
of the 180-day policy, see Crawford v. Pittman, 708 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1983); Yaris v. Special School
Dist., 558 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Mo. 1983), af'd, 728 F.2d 1055 (8th Cir. 1984); Georgia Ass'n of
Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 511 F. Supp. 1263 (N.D. Ga. 1981), afd, 716 F.2d 1565 (11 th Cir.
1983).
122. 476 F. Supp. at 604.
123. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981).
124. Id. at 276.
125. See S. SARASON &J. DORIS, supra note 8, at 305.
126. S. SMITH, No EASY ANSWERS: THE LEARNING DISABLED CHILD (1979). Sally Smith is an
associate professor at American University and the founder and director of the Law School of the
Kingsbury Center.
127. Id. at 113-14; see also Krass, The Right to Public Education for Handicapped Children: A Primer for
the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1016, 1025 (1976).
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however, are willing to concur in this belief. Levine v. Institutions & Agencies
Department 128 involved two profoundly retarded children residing in a state
institution for the mentally retarded. Nineteen-year-old Linda Guempel had
an IQ between 14 and 35 and a mental and social age of 20 months. Her
program emphasized the development of body awareness, sensorimotor skills,
and rudimentary self-help skills. Max Levine was 10 years old and confined to
a crib as a result of severe brain damage. A physician noted that Max, at age
one, remained in a "frog position" with his hands clenched and no control
over his head movements. In 1974 Max was admitted into the state institution
with an estimated IQ of 1, the motor development of a one-month-old child,
no vocalization or language skills, and extremely low adaptive behavior.
Although Max had no regularly scheduled programming, as of March 1979 he
was able to make sounds, follow objects, respond to noises, and demonstrate
pleasure by smiling and moving his head toward the stimulation.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that advances in the fields of
education, medical science, and psychology created progressively more
opportunities for greater numbers of children to benefit from education, and
that some courts therefore might determine that a child such as Max was enti-
tled to an appropriate education. Nevertheless, the court stated that
the sad fact endures that there is a category of mentally disabled children so severely
impaired as to be unable to absorb or benefit from education. It is neither realistic nor
meaningful to equate the type of care and habilitation which such children require for
their health and survival with 'education' in the sense that that term is used in the
[New Jersey] [C]onstitution. 12 9
According to the court, Max Levine and Linda Guempel were examples of this
type of child.
Several possible rationales may explain the Levine decision. The case was
decided under a clause in the New Jersey Constitution which requires a thor-
ough and efficient public school system. The goal of that clause, according to
the court, was not to provide care for the mentally handicapped, but to pre-
pare children to function politically, economically, and socially in a demo-
cratic society.130 Since profoundly retarded institutionalized children like
Max and Linda would never be able to function in such a manner, the consti-
tutional guarantee of education did not extend to them or to their habilitation
programs. Futhermore, after noting that the parents of both children did not
otherwise question their "moral or legal" obligation to support their children
and that both sets of parents were fully capable of paying their share of sup-
port, the court found no reason to release them of the obligation. 13 1
The Levine opinion has been fiercely criticized, beginning with a scathing
128. 84 N.J. 234, 418 A.2d 229 (1980).
129. Id. at 250, 418 A.2d at 237.
130. Id. at 244-49, 418 A.2d at 234-36.
131. Parental obligation for support was calculated on the basis of a statutory formula and
reduced by an educational credit for educational expenses of teacher salaries and educational sup-
plies and equipment. The final amount also took into account parental ability to pay. Any remaining
costs were the responsibility of the state or the county of residence. Id. at 242-43, 418 A.2d at 233.
Page 63: Spring 1985]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
dissent by Justice Pashman in which he emphatically denounced the sugges-
tion that any child is ineducable. The majority's opinion, according to the
dissent, diminished the meaning of our common humanity and denied educa-
tion its fundamental status by subordinating it to the ability to exercise the
franchise or compete in the labor market. Justice Pashman continued:
I have no quarrel with the majority that the education which children like Linda
Guempel and Maxwell Levine can absorb is, even at their present ages, far less than
that of the mentally average 5-year-old. Nevertheless, I cannot accept a definition of
education which does not provide to each child the training and assistance necessary
to function as best they can in whatever will be their environment--even if that envi-
ronment will be insulated from the world of politics and economic competition ....
The rudimentary level of their education does not render it unworthy of constitutional
protection. We cannot ignore the intellect a child possesses because he possesses so
little .... 132
In addition to the criticism offered by Justice Pashman, commentators
have found a number of faults in the Levine decision.13 3 The decision has
been criticized because of the speculative nature of differentiating between
educable children and children incapable of education. The Levine court dis-
missed this concern on the basis that workable guidelines have been formu-
lated to deal with the problem in the past. Although the court noted that
advances in teaching technology might render more children educable, the
decision does not account for such changes. Furthermore, the court did not
propose any safeguards to ensure accurate prediction of ineducability. A
child determined to be ineducable more than likely would be tucked away in a
program where any hidden potential would remain undiscovered and unreal-
ized. Given the difficulty of predicting the ability of any child to learn, this
consequence is unjustly harsh. The court also failed to consider all of the
previously stated purposes and objectives of education, other than the goal of
self-sufficiency, which should apply to all children regardless of handicap.
A case like Levine arising under the EAHCA rather than a state constitution
may have a different result. Several courts and commentators have observed
that the EAHCA contains no exclusions for children suffering from exception-
ally severe handicaps. 134 In Matthews v. Campbell13 5 the court ordered resi-
dential placement at no cost to the parents despite "serious misgivings" about
the ultimate efficacy of the placement, and a belief that attaining even a min-
132. Levine, 84 N.J. at 275, 418 A.2d at 250 (Pashman, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
133. See Rothstein, Educational Rights of Severely and Profoundly Handicapped Children, 61 NEB. L.
REV. 586 (1982). This article also states the following:
It should be noted that the New Jersey Standards on Public Institutions for the Division of
Mental Retardation provide that educational services are "deliberate attempts to facilitate the
intellectual, sensorimotor, and effective development of the individual .... ." It is noteworthy
that the head of the Adaptive Learning Center at Hunterdon School considered the following
activities to fall within the "education program": increasing body control through motor skill
development, increasing awareness through multisensory stimulation, developing self-help
skills, developing social and emotional growth, developing receptive and expressive language,
and developing visual and auditory skills.
Id. at 606 n.108 (citation omitted).
134. See Rothstein, supra note 133; Krass, supra note 127.
135. 1979-80 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 551:264 (E.D. Va. 1979).
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imum level of self-sufficiency was an almost impossible goal. The Matthews
court based its decision on the fact that "neither the language of the Act nor
the legislative history appears to contemplate the possibility that some chil-
dren may simply be untrainable."' 136 Furthermore, Congress must certainly
have set its priorities with these most seriously handicapped children in mind.
Actually, Congress' intent is not so clear. A reading of the legislative his-
tory suggests that Congress may have been primarily concerned with handi-
capped children who, despite their limitations, are capable in some ways of
learning, being creative, and becoming productive. The Supreme Court's
opinion in Board of Education v. Rowley 13 7 could certainly be read as envisioning
that the recipients of educational services under the EAHCA would be chil-
dren capable of benefiting from instruction. Such theories, however, fail to
consider that Congress probably relied on a broad concept of education
which differs considerably from traditional public school education.
The Fifth Circuit observed, in a 180-day-rule case, that "the Act requires
the state to treat each child as an individual, a human whose unique qualities
and needs can be evaluated and served only by a plan designed with wisdom,
care and educational expertise."' 138 Other commentators have concurred in
this perception of education as a "humanization process," as well as a tradi-
tional learning process. One psychologist has stated:
The process whereby an individual is helped to develop new behavior or to apply
existing behavior, so as to equip him to cope more effectively with his total environ-
ment [is education]. It should be clear, therefore, that when we speak of education we
do not limit ourselves to the so-called academics. We certainly include the develop-
ment of basic self-help skills. Indeed, we include those very complex bits of behavior
which help to define an individual as human. We include such skills as toilet training,
dressing, grooming, communicating and so on. 139
According to this humanization view of the EAHCA, "each child must be
dealt with at his individual developmental level, and no failure to do so can be
countenanced on the basis of the difficulty of a child's problems to treat, or
the inadequacy of public resources."' 140
C. The Influence of Cost
Unfortunately, factors other than a child's ability to learn have had a sub-
stantial impact on the decisions of courts and educational agencies concerning
the education of handicapped children. Because of inadequate resources,
agencies and courts have relied on the cost of education to justify the exclu-
sion of certain children, especially as the visible results of education
136. Id. at 551:266.
137. 458 U.S. 176 (1982); see supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
138. Crawford v. Pittman, 708 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1983).
139. Roos, Current Issues in the Education of Mentally Retarded Persons, in PROCEEDINGS: CONFER-
ENCE ON THE EDUCATION OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONs 2 (W. Cegelka ed. 1971), quoted in Roth-
stein, supra note 133, at 608.
140. Colley, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA): A Statutory and Legal Analysis, 10
J.L. & EDUC. 137, 160-61 (1981).
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decrease.' 4 ' Such reliance has sometimes led to discriminatory results, not
only between handicapped and nonhandicapped children, but also among,
and within, classes of handicapped children. The educational agency in Levine
v. Institutions & Agencies Department, 142 for example, distinguished between
children in residential programs and those in day programs who were
receiving the same or similar services. Parents of the residentially placed chil-
dren were responsible for a substantial part of their child's program costs,
relieved only by an educational credit determined on the basis of teacher sala-
ries and educational equipment. Day school children received an education at
no cost to their parents. Furthermore, the educational credit given to the par-
ents of the residential children was significantly lower than the cost of the day
school program and did not account for related services.
The New Jersey court held that this variance did not deny equal protection
of the laws and proposed several theories for its decision. The funding
scheme, according to the court, encouraged mainstreaming by providing a
financial disincentive to parents who place their children in residential institu-
tions. ' 43 The flaw in this justification lies in its reliance on the fallacious belief
that all handicapped children are better off living at home instead of in a resi-
dential facility. In reality, some handicapped children can benefit from an
education only if they have 24-hour instruction and care and, thus, appro-
priate education for such children includes residential care. The use of gener-
alizations to determine "appropriateness" violates the requirement of the
EAHCA that each child be considered individually. Moreover, the funding
scheme may, in some cases, provide incentive for families to place their handi-
capped child in an inappropriate educational setting.
The Levine court also considered significant the "unquestioned" moral
obligations of parents to pay for the care of their children. Nothing in the
EAHCA prohibits a school system from charging a parent for services other
than educational care, or for a portion of the cost of residential placement
when day care has been determined to be "appropriate education" for that
child. A parent who chooses the residential placement route, however, should
not be penalized for making that choice. Educational services provided free
of charge to day school children should be equally available to similarly handi-
capped children in residential placements.
The Levine court found it relevant that the state statutory scheme chal-
lenged by the plaintiffs in that case took into account the parents' ability to
pay. 144 The EAHCA, however, makes no exclusions on the basis of the
parent's ability to pay. All handicapped children, regardless of the severity,
cause, or cost of handicap, are entitled to a free and appropriate education
under the EAHCA. Public school systems do not charge parents of nonhandi-
141. See supra note 115.
142. 84 NJ. 234, 418 A.2d 229 (1980); see supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
143. 84 N.J. at 263, 418 A.2d at 244.
144. The court conceded that the plaintiffs may be entitled to relief in relation to a determina-
tion of the amount of educational credit, especially in light of the EAHCA mandate of free public
special education and related services. Id. at 264, 418 A.2d at 244.
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capped children for the education of their children according to their ability
to pay. To do so for parents of handicapped children would be directly
opposed to the EAHCA mandate which calls for equality of educational
opportunity. According to the legislative history, insufficiency of resources is
no defense to unequal treatment. The Senate report stated the following
principle:
[A]vailable funds must be expended equitably in such a manner that no child is
entirely excluded from a publicly supported education consistent with his needs and
ability to benefit therefrom. The inadequacies of the . .. [slystem ... certainly
cannot be permitted to bear more heavily on the "exceptional" or handicapped child
than on the normal child. 1
4 5
Such a statement is evidence enough that, while Congress foresaw
shortages of educational resources and deferred to the states as to the alloca-
tion of those resources, it also intended to forestall any attempt by a school
system to differentiate among children based upon the cost of their respective
educations. Nevertheless, it appears from recent EAHCA cases that courts
and agencies have continued to consider cost-indicative factors when making
determinations under the EAHCA.
A UNIFORM AND FLEXIBLE DEFINITION
If the EAHCA is to operate nondiscriminatorily, there must exist a uni-
form definition of education consistent with the goals of the EAHCA.
According to the court in Battle v. Pennsylvania,146 educational needs are neces-
sarily determined in reference to goals. A child only needs certain program-
ming in order to accomplish certain educational objectives. It seems,
therefore, the definition of education provided by an individual judge, court,
or agency determines not only what a handicapped child receives in educa-
tional services but also what that child needs.
It should now be clear that education should not be defined with reference
to the cost of a program or to notions of parental fault. In addition, it is
evident that Congress did not exclude severely or profoundly handicapped
children from the Act's coverage. Congress very likely relied on the broad
concept of education that was prevalent in the field of education in the 1970's.
The legislative history acknowledges that Congress was greatly influenced by
court cases in the early 1970's that established a right to free and appropriate
education for all handicapped children. 14 7 Congress also must have been
influenced to some extent by the prevailing attitudes of contemporary theo-
rists and educators that no child is ineducable.
If Congress intended that education be provided to even the most severely
145. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS
1425, 1447 (quoting Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972)).
146. 629 F.2d 269, 276 (3d Cir. 1980), remanding Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa.
1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981).
147. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa.
1971) (per curiam), 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1972); see supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
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handicapped children, then certainly that education must mean something
beyond conventional education. In some cases, this type of education may
mean something beyond even the attainment of basic life skills. Such a defini-
tion also includes the instruction given to a child with a serious emotional
disturbance in order to assist him or her in learning and adjusting to the
normal world.
The key concept underlying these definitions is that whatever a child can
learn is education to that child. Education is a relative concept which begins
wherever the normal course of development left off and follows a natural
course.
This definition is intentionally flexible, adaptable to each child, and sub-
ject to change as a child's needs and abilities change. A child initially may
have the educational goal of attaining basic self-help skills. If a child can
achieve that goal, his or her definition of education will then take a somewhat
higher form, perhaps learning simple arithmetic or learning to read. If a child
cannot attain self-sufficiency, that child's education is measured by whatever it
is he or she is able to learn. If a child is not entitled to the opportunity to
maximize his or her potential, he or she is at least entitled to progress from
simple tasks to more complex tasks, each building on the other, much as non-
handicapped children are given the opportunity to progress from grade to
grade.
A flexible definition has a number of advantages. It takes into account the
varying degrees of ability of handicapped children and makes educational
experience uniquely suited to each child's needs. It also is consistent with the
Supreme Court's determination in Board of Education v. Rowley 148 that all hand-
icapped children are entitled to some educational benefit. Such a definition
excludes no handicapped children on the basis of cost, parental fault, or
severity of handicap and, thus, avoids making arbitrary distinctions among
handicapped children. It is based on notions of equality and individualiza-
tion, consistent with legislative intent.
Opponents will criticize this definition for not taking into account the con-
straint of scarce resources. Admittedly, educational resources are currently
limited. Clearly, however, Congress did not intend that scarce resources
would deny education to any handicapped child. Instead, it intended to pro-
vide assistance to state educational agencies for the excess costs involved in
educating all handicapped children. Furthermore, the cost of a program has
no relevance in determining whether or not that program is education. Theo-
retically, a program which is considered education in a wealthy school district
should still be considered education in a poor school district. Rather than
permit states to slight handicapped children on the basis of scarce resources,
Congress has required the states to provide certain programs regardless of
cost. A fortunate consequence of such congressional prodding would arise if
states were forced, as a result, to reconsider and increase their educational
148. 458 U.S. 176 (1982); see supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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budgets. In any event, allocation of resources must at least be equitable and
must not weigh more heavily against the handicapped. Every handicapped
child must receive some portion of the educational pie, even if that portion is
instruction in the most fundamental of skills.
Such a definition of education is, in reality, a conglomeration of the more
traditional definitions arranged on a sliding scale to be applied individually to
the unique situation of each handicapped child. The novelty of this approach
lies not in the definitions used, but in the use of the definitions.
V
CONCLUSION
Ideally, a flexible definition of education could be determined for all chil-
dren, both handicapped and nonhandicapped, focusing on each child's indi-
vidual needs and potential. It has even been suggested that IEP's be
developed for all children. 149 Unfortunately, educational resources are often
far too limited to provide such individualization. Under the EAHCA, how-
ever, Congress has selected one group of special children, the handicapped,
who are most in need of individualized education, and has required special
treatment for that group from the educational agencies. Education of these
special children cannot be defined simply as conventional education. Rather,
it must incorporate a broader concept of education and include whatever a
handicapped child is able to learn in light of his or her unique needs and
particular handicaps.
Lauren A. Larson
149. M. MCCARTHY & P. DEIGNAN, WHAT LEGALLY CONSTITUTES AN ADEQUATE PUBLIC EDUCA-
TION? 86 (1983).
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